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Douglas: Douglas on Ong

Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1999. 325 pp. ISBN 0822322692.
Reviewed by Christopher Douglas, Furman University
Aihwa Ong’s Flexible Citizenship begins with an anecdote about Hong Kong business leaders
who, facing the political uncertainty of the city-state’s imminent return to the People’s Republic
of China in 1997, began to accumulate foreign passports not only as a “matter of convenience,”
but, as one let slip accidentally, “a matter of confidence.” Ong’s book is about this ambivalence
that attends the flows of people and capital across the Pacific, and the cultural meanings that are
created in order to make sense of them. For Ong, the Hong Kong business elite adopted a kind of
“flexible citizenship” in the wake of Tiananmen Square and with a view to Hong Kong’s
patriation: “Many Hong Kongers opted to work in China while seeking citizenship elsewhere.
Caught between British disciplinary racism and China’s opportunistic claims of racial loyalty,
between declining economic power in Britain and surging capitalism in Asia, they sought a
flexible position among the myriad possibilities (and problems) found in the global economy”
(123). In working out how this flexibility is both a product and a condition of late capitalism, her
book discusses the way the practices of the transnational Chinese business elite are imagined by
themselves and by Southeast Asian states.
The Introduction frames the larger methodological and disciplinary stakes of Ong’s project.
Flexible Citizenship poses its arguments against three models that attempt to theorize
“migrations, diasporas, and other transnational flows” (8). The first is migration studies, which
sees subjects moving from peripheral countries to core ones (mostly the United States but
increasingly European ones). The second model, which Ong associates with Arjun Appadurai’s
Modernity at Large (1996), sees cultural globalization as being produced through a kind of
“virtual neighborhood,” a process, says Ong, that fails to differentiate between “the power of
mobile and nonmobile subjects” (11). The third model against which Ong poses her own work is
cultural studies and postcolonial theory in the U.S., which Ong criticizes for their lack of
material analysis, and for their ascription of heroic resistance to capitalism to the subaltern/the
colonized, an “innocent concept of the essential diasporan subject, one that celebrates hybridity,
‘cultural’ border crossing, and the production of difference” (13). Her critique on this account
encompasses the work of Paul Gilroy, Stuart Hall, James Clifford and Homi Bhabha: according
to Ong, such work is part of a middle class academic intellectual fantasy that ascribes resistance
to capitalism (which the academic is enjoying, for the most part) to an oppressed “colonized”
subject across the sea. In a sense, this book is an important correction and theorization of what
Ong considers these errors; her analysis is embedded in economic contexts, and she examines the
business elites and growing middle classes in Asia who have benefited from capitalism--while
paying some attention as well to the working women and men, ethnic minorities, and aboriginal
peoples who pay the price of development.
The first section of the book charts the discursive production of “a distinctive Chinese modernity
linked to overseas Chinese” (36). Ong details the post-Mao Chinese strategy of negotiating with
global capitalism: “a particular combination of the developmentalist state [wherein the state
facilitates quick growth], the disciplining of labor forces, the careful cultivation of transnational
capital, the repression of human rights, and economic competition with the West” (38). Amidst
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the changes engendered by these processes, Ong discerns the state’s strategic revival of a
discourse of Confucianism as a moral force that links Chinese modernity to the overseas Chinese
(huaqiao) in Southeast Asia and the United States. Herself a huaqiao born in Malaysia and now
in the Anthropology Department at Berkeley, Ong finds good economic reasons for the newly
minted official view of the overseas Chinese:
A new discourse, produced by the officially controlled media, has constructed a new term for
these diasporan subjects--haiwai huaren, or “Chinese living overseas,” an ambiguous label that
removes the old stigma of huaqiao but retains the master symbol of irrefutable racial/ cultural
links to the motherland. After being vilified by mainlanders, overseas Chinese are stereotyped as
the embodiment of traditional Chinese familialism, business acumen, and talent for wealth
making--the old Chinese folk values that are now being officially valorized for building a bridge
to China’s modern future. (43-4)
Ong goes on to analyze the way “Confucianism” is deployed by such discourse in order to
normalize--to make “Chinese”--the ongoing market restructuring. Which is not to say, of course,
that local mainland populations don’t produce other kinds of knowledge about the huaqiao’s role
in Chinese modernity as exploitative and corrupt. The second chapter continues her analysis of
the way discourses about race and nation are important to the self-conceptualization of Chinese
modernity. While official discourse suspects the loyalty of the huaqiao (are they profiteers or
patriots?), it also sees them as a kind of offshore stored memory in that they are understood to
embody the pre-Communist traditions that are important to the market changes taking place in
the nation. The overseas Chinese have likewise been seen as important contributors to the
economic modernities in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Vietnam. Ong sees “Confucianism” as an ideological sign deployed by Lee Kuan Yew (the
ex-prime minister of Singapore) and others as a way of resolving the tensions created by global
capitalism between national interests and market interests, and between community stability and
individual freedom. This discourse also serves, in what Ong calls a “self-orientalizing” move, in
official illustrations of how “Asian values” differ from other, more decadent, Western ones (80).
In the second section, Ong moves to an analysis of the economic and cultural strategies of the
huaqiao. As part of the strategy of flexible citizenship, the overseas Chinese business elite and
their families may buy homes in North America and send their children to prestigious American
colleges even as they continue to base businesses primarily in Southeast Asia. They find,
however, that their economic capital is not so easily converted into social capital because of the
symbolic racial hierarchies already established in the North American places of residence. Ong
examines the cultural conflict that attends the elite’s mobility, and moves interestingly beyond
the simplistic “anti-immigrant backlash” explanation; instead, she argues that “In the
commonsensical view of ethnic succession, recent arrivals from non-Western countries are
expected to enter at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder and wait their proper turn to reach
middle-class status” (100). She looks at one instance of white resistance to Asian mobility in
neighborhood groups’ racialized opposition to newer “monster homes,” and at the way some
huaqiao use philanthropy--particularly to the arts and to universities--as a strategy to gain social
prestige and acceptance. In Southeast Asia, meanwhile, Ong examines the practices of family
businesses and their reliance on guanxi (personal and kinship networks) across borders. Here,
too, Ong sees a euphemism when guanxi is named a core “Chinese” value: noting that guanxi is
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a power effect that often controls women and the poor, Ong argues that business guanxi is
“basically a structure of limits and inequality for the many and of flexibility and mobility for the
few” (117). The business family is structured along gender lines in a way that bears out the
transformative power of transnational changes: “family regimes have become more flexible in
both dispersing and localizing members . . . . [with] the business traveler as an ‘astronaut’ who is
continually in the air while the wife and children [sometimes called ‘parachute kids’ if they are
alone] are located in Australia, Canada, or the United States, earning rights of residence” (127).
But even as Ong traces the “image management” of the elite, she repeatedly makes clear that
such strategies of flexible citizenship remain impossible for the working classes and others
among the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia.
The third section continues this analysis of how discourse about the family gets caught up in
ideology: a primary example is the way overseas Chinese have articulated a “fraternal tribal
capitalism” (143), in which “doing business man to man,” or brother to brother, is seen as a way
to bypass the state’s paternal legal and political rules (145). Ong notes that these practices are
being extended throughout the region, and such fraternal business connections are increasingly
viewed as successful because they in turn form partnerships with the families and bureaucrats of
authoritarian governments. She goes on to analyze the way that, in the current structure of
mobility wherein flexibility is coded as (and is in fact) a masculine property, guanxi for working
class Chinese women is imagined as the huaqiao boyfriend (or, preferably, husband) who is the
ticket to a more glamorous life abroad. The growing popular culture that serves the expanding
middle-class ethnic Chinese consumer in Asia also gives evidence of this kind of fraternal order;
such media posit a transnational Chinese community that links the overseas Chinese to one
another. Discussing the international visibility of such film personae as John Woo, Chow Yun
Fat and Jackie Chan, Ong notes that the “overall message of the kung fu and gangster movies is
that the Chinese values of fraternal solidarity and justice are both vulnerable and vital in the
chaotic world of Asian capitalism” (164). On the other hand, Ong shows how the influx of
American satellite television channels such as MTV Asia and Star TV, with their use of Eurasian
multilingual video jockeys, work to create “a modern ‘pan-Asian’ subject at home anywhere in
the continent.” As with other cultural formations, Ong sees a capitalist logic behind this one as
well: “The images distributed by Star TV, while culturally diverse and hybridized, seem to
configure a depolicitized consumerist modernity that treats Asia as a rijsttafel of cultures,
languages, and ethnicities and avoids issues of political difference” (168).
In the final section, Ong turns her attention to the way Southeast Asian nations have fashioned
responses both to global capitalism and to the flexible citizenship it engenders. She takes issue
with Samuel P. Huntington’s well-known 1993 Foreign Affairs article, “The Clash of
Civilizations?” While acknowledging that Huntington’s article is repeatedly misread by those
who anticipate and want to prepare for a military confrontation between the United States and
China (in fact, Huntington called for a peaceful coexistence rather than a military “clash”), Ong
argues that Huntington’s thinking is ultimately based on an outmoded orientalist “West versus
Rest” binary, “which depends on an assumption of the lack of historical dynamism in regions
(such as ‘the Orient’) that are defined by the center as peripheral” (189). In particular, Ong takes
issue with Huntington’s notion that the adoption of economic liberalism in Asia has led to a
resurgence of religious feeling and not the anticipated adoption of such Enlightenment values as
the freedoms of press and assembly. In response, Ong unravels the concept of liberalism, and
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shows that what this civilizational discourse terms “Asian values” are in fact the working out of
market rationality--itself a result of post-Enlightenment liberalism--in the sense that “Asian tiger
economies [are] liberal formations dedicated to the most efficient way of achieving maximal
economic performance” (195).
Although this deconstruction of “liberalism” is unlikely to assuage human rights activists on both
sides of the Pacific, Ong notes as well that states pursuing such postdevelopmentalist strategies
are increasingly adopting nonrepressive means of control not because they are convinced by such
socially liberal discourse, but because they seek to nurture their growing middle classes that have
the technical expertise to manage the influx of global capital. Here she returns to an earlier theme
and examines the way “Asian values” and “traditions” are deployed by the state in order to
normalize social structures that are conducive to global capitalism: “while the Asian tigers used
to govern too much through repressive measures, the shift to postdevelopmental strategies
reveals that more and more, the solution to the liberal paradox of maximizing gain and
minimizing government is to exercise disciplinary and pastoral powers that are cast in the
principles of Islam or Confucianism” (210). In the final chapter of Flexible Citizenship, Ong
argues that states have fashioned creative responses to global capitalism, and that the idea that
the nation-state necessarily loses power because of these changes needs to be interrogated. Here
she proposes one of the most interesting concepts of the book--that of “graduated sovereignty,”
in which the state subjects “different sectors of the population to different regimes of valuation
and control” (217), and creates different “zones” of law internally. She takes as a primary
example Malaysia, with its three ethnicities (Malays, Chinese, and Indians) and its “six zones of
graduated sovereignty” (“the low-wage manufacturing sector, the illegal labor market, the
aboriginal periphery, the refugee camp, the cyber corridor, and the growth triangle,” the last of
which is made up of three border-straddling economic development areas [218]) and details the
different modes of law and state intervention that discipline each. Ong offers a deconstruction
parallel to the one she performs on the discourse of Confucianism among governments trying to
shape the imaginary of the Chinese business elites: in Malaysia, for instance, a new Islam
friendly to global capitalism is emerging as a force that “is built on the common Islamic links
between Malaysia, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian countries” (227); this new Islam
“promotes new normativities in cultural behavior, technical expertise, and regional cooperation”
(228).
Flexible Citizenship is an invaluable contribution to the study of late capitalism in Asia--and in
the world--and is one that I would highly recommend for scholars and students in Asia-Pacific
studies and related disciplines. What interests me most about the book is Ong’s deconstruction of
the larger cultural discourses that have been set into play by states and elites in order to
normalize the populations and practices required by global transnational business. One of the
salient themes in Ong’s book is that the “peripheral” subjects and nations--viewed by past and
current Western theory as dependent on and reactive to the West--have a great deal of economic
and imaginative agency as they participate in the ongoing creation of global capitalism. Her
deconstruction of Asia’s use of “Asian values” as immutable and essential is carefully paired
with the orientalizing discourses that have produced similar ideologies in the West, and, in
another parallel, her characterization of the new market-friendly Confucianism and Islam can’t
help but call to mind the market-friendly Christianity that dominates the United States today. The
governments’ role in fashioning the ideological meanings of capital and nation is a fascinating
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concept, and though Ong does not state it as such, it has a predictive power. We may now expect
New Delhi to begin outlining a market-friendly Hinduism that will both call “home” the Indian
and Indian American software millionaires of Silicon Valley and make manageable the booming
middle class of software engineers, whose software and computer-related services were a $4
billion industry in 1999, and who develop and maintain from India the computer software for
many of the largest U.S. companies.
Of equal interest is Ong’s analysis of the huaqiao’s self-orientalizing procedures as they try to
normalize the elite’s practices of flexible citizenship. My own research has been concerned with
the American imaginary’s use of racial and cultural stereotypes, which are what the editors of the
early Asian American literature anthology Aiiieeeee! called “the low-maintenance engine of
white supremacy.” For these editors, one of the dominant stereotypes is that of the Asian
American as a sojourner in America, someone with an immutable and virtually genetic
attachment to the ancestral land, to which he or she longs to return. But Ong remarks: “Whereas
[Edward] Said has described orientalism as a one-sided and self-reifying process, I have tried
throughout this chapter to represent the discursive objects themselves as cocreators in
orientalism” (131). Both the huaqiao and official (Asian) state discourse help promulgate a
sojourner discourse, as Ong shows when she says that Lee Kuan Yew implies that “although
ethnic Chinese have lived among other cultural groups, they have remained ‘Chinese’ in a basic,
unchanging way” (68).
Here Ong notes the conflicts that can attend the different practices of the older Asian American
groups and the newly formed huaqiao associations, who don’t necessarily have citizenship in the
United States. This problem is a crucial one, as Ong recognizes: in the American imaginary, are
Asians in America loyal citizens or potentially disloyal sojourners? As Ong argues, “The recent
uproar over illegal Asian contributions to the Democratic National Committee reflects America’s
deep ambivalence about whether Asians or Asian Americans can ever be morally distinguished
or ever become ‘legitimate’ Americans” (176). Too late for inclusion in her book was the
December, 1999 predicament of Wen Ho Lee, the American scientist at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory who was fired, charged with removing nuclear secrets from a Laboratory computer,
and suspected of passing those secrets on to China. What is at stake in both these images is that
of the Asian sojourner who is loyal to a foreign land. But Ong questions the strategy of
established Asian American groups to distance themselves from the arriviste huaqiao. Asserting
that “About 60 percent of Asian Americans are foreign born” (280), a truth claim for which she
offers no explanation or documentation, Ong argues that “By defending themselves as Asian
Americans, an ethno-racial category, rather than as American citizens with universal political
claims as members of the nation, Asian Americans continue to be trapped by an American
ideology that limits the moral claims to social legitimacy by nonwhites” (180). One wonders
why she believes that Asian Americans can’t do both: that is, assert a universal right to
citizenship and have a conceptual space for ethnic identity. Asian Americans are not the first
racial minority to claim American citizenship while preserving some sense of ethnic communal
identity.
As with her discussion of Asian American strategies of inclusion, her use of the word
“transnationality” also seems insufficiently worked out. By “transnationality” in the subtitle, Ong
basically means population and capital flows among China, Southeast Asia, and the United
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States. This arrangement has the U.S. standing in as basically the sole point of reference for the
Americas, which is strange considering the presence of Asians--and particularly Chinese--in
Vancouver and in Toronto. The dynamics she describes are at work in these places as well, as
she notes in several passing references; but a fuller consideration of them and their differences
from a U.S. context would only have strengthened Ong’s arguments. For example, what’s
missing from her account of white American resistance to the “monster homes” of some of the
huaqiao is the anxiety in the white middle class that they won’t be able to pass on their status as
home-owners to their children. To take Vancouver as an example, since 1980 housing prices
have ballooned to the extent that the educated children of the white Canadian middle class
cannot generally afford the same kind of house as their parents did. This inflationary change is
overidentified with Asian immigration (there are other factors as well, such as internal white
Canadian migration from East to West), but nonetheless there is a sense that new money
destabilizes the class system in Vancouver, with the upper middle class no longer certain that it
can pass that status (as marked by homeownership, as Ong notes) on to its children.
The final and needless Afterword to the volume is guaranteed to offend anyone who is not an
anthropologist, for Ong takes it as an opportunity to excoriate “universalizing armchair theorists”
(240), by which she appears to mean sociologists, those associated with cultural studies and
postcolonial studies, and even earlier anthropologists. Against these disciplinary duds, Ong
offers “A newer generation of anthropologists who are freeing themselves from the binarism of
older models and deploying poststructuralist theories” (242). In case you are an anthropologist
and aren’t sure which group you fit into, Ong includes a lengthy endnote naming salient texts
(her first book is among them). This privileging of the new anthropology--to be carefully
distinguished from other new anthropologies, such as that of James Clifford--is strange,
considering her use of Foucault in analyzing “truth claims”; what about her own discipline and
her own work? Hasn’t anthropology ever borrowed anything useful from a different discipline?
Isn’t “culture-as-a-text,” rejected by Ong (242), a useful metaphor, insofar as it urges
anthropologists to develop different kinds of reading techniques (something Margaret Mead
needed badly)? While this Afterword seems intended to return the reader to some of the
methodological stakes which Ong broached in her Introduction, its tone of disciplinary
chauvinism is not characteristic of the greater part of the book.
A final limitation of Flexible Citizenship is one that it shares with many book volumes that are
essentially collections of previously-published journal articles: I don’t mean the problem of the
coherence of the work, since this eight-chapter volume is held together very nicely by its themes
of global capitalism in the Asia-Pacific region and the economic responses and cultural
fashionings of both a transnational Chinese business elite and the national governments in
Southeast Asia. The problem instead is the currency of the work; although the book was
published in 1999, five of the eight chapters were published between 1992 and 1997. While Ong
can’t be blamed for this publishing lag, the problem is that the book appears unevenly revised
between its inception as a series of articles and then as a final volume. At one point, for instance,
she refers to “the rising affluence of Asian countries and the relative decline of Western
economies” (120)--a statement that made sense when it appeared as an article in 1994, but that
requires some explanation in 2000 or in 1999. The five years between its initial appearance (not
to say when it was actually written) and the book’s publication has been a time of heady
economic expansion, especially in the United States, and a concurrent slump in the Asian tiger
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economies. This leaves the reader unsatisfied--this recent book is already a little dated on some
issues; we’d like to know what Ong thinks of more contemporary developments in the Pacific
rim economies.
Although there are some references to the current troubles, there’s no sense of how they fit into
Ong’s picture as a whole. In the seventh chapter, for instance, Ong opens a sentence by stating,
“With the world’s economies under assault from speculation by Wall Street banks” (212), but
then appears to back off of this interpretation in the next chapter when she says that “whereas the
international press attributes the recent wave of currency devaluation to reckless borrowing and
lending, the building of megaprojects, and the lack of market controls in the tiger economies,
local politicians blame outsiders, who are viewed as having the antithesis of Asian civilizational
values” (232). The chapter’s concluding paragraph begins “Indeed, as this book goes to press,
the economic typhoon unleashed by unruly capital markets has toppled the Soeharto regime and
shattered Indonesia’s economy. In contrast, Asian tiger countries have responded by
strengthening the hand of the state against capital flows” (239). That Ong’s book ends in medias
res is not her fault, but it leaves the reader knowing that an important part of this story is untold
in Flexible Citizenship--indeed, that the story itself is still unfolding. Ong’s important book
provides an invaluable interpretive structure for its readers to watch what will follow.
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